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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELMER HANKS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Vs. 
MARK CHRISTENSEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
CASE NO. 
9190 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For many years prior to 1958 the plaintiff 
and defendant owned large tracts of land in South 
Utah County. 
The land of the plaintiff was used primarily 
for cattle grazing, and the land of the defendant was 
used for sheep grazing. On the 18th day of October, 
19'58, the defendant intentionally kindled a number of 
fires on his land between 8:00 o'clock a. m. and 10:00 
O'clock a. m. (Tr. 386, 1. 19-25) "These fires were 
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~ 
set approximately 75 feet from the plaintiff's pro-
perty line (Tr. 386, 1. 29) in an area where the 
defendant had not cleaned out the firebreak between 
the plaintiff's and defendant's property. (Tr. 429, 
1. 11-25) The range conditions were extremely dry 
and the leaves, brush and weeds in the area and in 
the firebreak were very dry. Afterletting the fires 
burn most of the day, the defendant and his wife re-
turned to check the fires around 4:00 o'clock p. m. 
the afternoon of October 18, 1958, and they found 
the fire had spread to an area of approximately one 
acre. (Tr. 432, 1. 26-30; Tr. 433, 1. 1-9) The 
defendant and his wife fought the fire which was then 
out of control for approximately one hour until 5:00 
o'clock p. m. on October 18, 1958, and then the de-
fendant and his wife left for help. (Tr., 433, 1. 
11-20) When the defendant and his wife began fight-
ing the fire around 4:00 o'clock p. m. there was 
very little wind. (Tr. 436, 1. 29) The defendant 
claims that "unusual and freak winds unexpectedly 
came up approximately ten hours after said fire 
was commenced up to approximately 85 miles per 
hour, which caused said fires to get out of control. 
That such conduct on the part of Mother Nature was 
an act of God and not foreseeable by the defendant 
and that the damages were caused through no fault 
of this defendant and were caused by instrumental-
ities not under the control of the defendant. " (De-
fendant's Third Defense, par. 6) There is no 
evidence in the record that there was any unusual 
or freak winds in the vicinity of the fire until after 
9:00 o'clock p. m. on October 18, 1958. 
-2-
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Fire fighting equipment arrived on the scene 
around 7:30 p. m. and around 9:00 p. m. the wind 
started blowing hard and the fire burned approxi-
mately·''3b0 to 400 acres of the plaintiff's ground, de-
stroyed or damaged approximately 510 cedar posts 
and burned considerable barbed wire.. (Tr. 369, 1. 
12-30; Tr. 370, 1. 1-13) 
Considerable damage was done to plaintiff's 
property by bulldozers brought in by the fire warden 
and the county to control the fire. 
After the fire, the plaintiff and the defendant 
talked about the damage which the plaintiff had sus-
tained and the defendant claimed a contract was 
made whereby the defendant was to do certain acts 
to compensate plaintiff for his damage. The plain-
tiff denies a contract was made. The parties were 
unable to resolve their differences or arrive at the 
fair measure of damages to be paid by defendant to 
plaintiff and the plaintiff filed his complaint. The 
case was tried before a jury. The jury was given 
special interrogatories on questions of fact. The 
jury returned a verdict against the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff filed a motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict and a motion for a new trial and 
both of these motions were denied. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING 
-3-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT PRO-
POSED INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY~O THE 
CONCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE. PR)CR 
POINT II 
(A) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT 
INFORMING PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY OF ITS 
ACTION UPON PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTIONS PRIOR TO INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY, AND 
(B) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT 
PERMITTING PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY TO 
TAKE EXCEPTIONS TO, OR TO OBJECT TO 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTING THE JURY WHERE 
THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE IN WRITING, PRIOR 
TO THE INSTRUCTIONS BEING GIVEN TO THE 
JURY, AND 
(C) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT 
PERMITTING PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL TO OB-
JECT, OR TAKE EXCEPTION TO THE COURT'S 
INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO THE JURY RETIRING 
TO CONSIDER ITS VERDICT. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCT-
ING THE JURY THAT NEGLIGENCE IN TffiS 
CASE IS "THE FAILURE TO USE ORDINARY AND 
REASONABLE CARE" AND THAT "ORDINARY 
-4-
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CARE" WAS THE MEASURE OF CARE TO BE 
USED IN THIS CASE. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCT-
ING THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT 
UNDER A DUTY TO ANTICIPATE AN UNUSUAL 
WIND AT THE TIME OF STARTING THE FIRE AND 
IF AN UNUSUAL AND UNEXPECTED HIGH,WIND 
AROSE DURING THE PROGRESS OF THE FIRE AND 
CARRIED THE FIRE WHERE IT WOULD NOT HAVE 
OTHERWISE SPREAD, SUCH WIND CONSTITUTES 
AN INTERVENING CAUSE OF THE PLAINTIFF'S IN-
JURY AND THE DEFENDANT WOULD BE RELIEVED 
OF LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED THEREBY. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING 
THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES AS DRAWN TO 
THE JURY, BECAUSE THE INTERROGATORIES 
AS SUBMITTED COULD ONLY BE ANSWERED IN 
FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE OF THE 
COURT'S ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING 
COUNSEL FOR PLA1NTIFF TO SUBMIT PROPOSED 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY PRIOR TO THE CON· 
CLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S CASE. 
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There is an "unwritten rule" in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court, which is often imposed by 
the trial judge which requires plaintiff's attorney 
to submit plaintiff's proposed instructions to the 
Court prior to the conclusion of plaintiff's case. 
This rule was imposed in this particular case and 
plaintiff's attorney was required to submit pro-
posed written instructions prior to the completion 
of plaintiff's case. Plaintiff submits this rule is 
arbitrary, not reasonable, and in this particular 
case, highly prejudicial to the rights of the plain-
tiff. Plaintiff recognizes the power and discretion 
of the trial court under the first sentence of Rule 
51, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which reads as 
follows: 
"At the close of the evidence or at such 
earlier time during the trial as the court 
reasonably directs, any party may file 
written requests that the Court instruct 
the jury on the law as set forth in said 
requests." 
However, in this case, because of the rambling, 
no theory, type of pleadings filed by the defend-
ant, it was impossible to prepare instructions 
covering defendant's theory of the case until de-
fendant's case had been presented subject to 
plaintiff's objections. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah in 
the case of State Bank of Beaver County v. Hol-
lingshead, 82 v. 416, 25 p 2d 612, held that it 
-6-
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is proper and generally necessary for the Court 
in its instructions to the jury to present the case 
of the plaintiff and defendant and that whatever 
theories are presented by the pleadings or other-
wise, in order to be submitted to the jury by way 
of instruction, must be supported by some evidence, 
since instructions must be responsive to issues and 
of such a nature that they are applicable to the evi-
dence received and submitted to the jury. This being 
the case, it is unreasonable, arbitrary and prejudic-
ial to the rights of the plaintiff to require him to 
submit proposed instructions to the jury prior to the 
completion of his own case and certainly prejudicial, 
arbitrary and unreasonable to require proposed in-
structions prior to defendant's evidence being pre-
sented. 
POINT II 
(A) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT IN-
FORMING PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY OF ITS 
ACTION UPON PLAINTIFF'S -REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTIONS PRIOR TO INSTRUCTING THE JURY, 
AND· 
(B) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT 
PERMITTING PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY TO TAKE 
EXCEPTIONS TO, OR TO OBJECT TO THE COURT'S 
INSTRUCTING THE JURY WHERE TIE INSTRUCTIONS 
WERE IN WRITING, PRIOR TO THE INSTRUCTIONS 
BEING GIVEN TO THE JURY, AND 
-7-
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(C) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT 
PERMITTING PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL TO OB-
JECT, OR TAKE EXCEPTION TO THE COURT'S 
INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO THE JURY RETIRING 
TO CONSIDER ITS VERDICT. 
In this particular case, the Court failed to 
give plaintiff's attorney any notice of its action 
upon plaintiff's requested instructions prior to 
ins true ting the jury, and plaintiff's attorney was 
not furnished with a copy of the Court's ins true-
tions until after the Court was giving its instruc-
tions to the jury. Plaintiff's attorney requested 
the Court reporter to get a copy of the instructions 
for plaintiff's attorney, which he did, but while the 
Court was already in the process of instructing 
the jury. 
There is also an "unwritten rule" in the 
Fourth Judicial District Courts that attorneys 
will not be permitted to take exceptions to the 
Court's instructions until after the jury has re-
tired to consider its verdict. 
In this particular case. plaintiff's attorney 
had no opportunity to make objection, or take ex-
ception to the Court's instructions prior to the 
Court giving the instructions because plaintiff's 
attorney never saw the Court's instruction until 
the Court commenced its instructions to the jury. 
To have objected at that time (while the Court 
waa in the process of instructing the jury) and to 
-8-
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have dismissed the jury and to have permitted 
plaintiff's attorney to take exception to the Court's 
instructions, and then to have recalled the jury 
and started over with re-instruction of the jury, 
would have certainly prejudiced the plaintiff's 
case, since the hour was late and the jury had al-
ready been subjected to a lengthy trial. 
Rule 46, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides as follows-: 
"Formal exceptions to rulings or or-
ders of the Court are unnecessary. It 
is sufficient that a party, at the time 
the ruling or order of the court is made 
or sought, makes known to the court 
the action which he desires the court to 
take or his objection to the action of the 
court and his grounds therefor; and, if 
a party has no opportunity to object to 
a ruling or order at the time it is made, 
the absence of an objection does not 
thereafter prejudice him. " 
Under the circumstances, plaintiff's attorney 
did not object or stop the proceedings of the Court 
in instructing the jury, because to have done so, 
at the time, wruld have prejudiced the plaintiff's 
position. 
Rule 51, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides as follows: 
-9-
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"At the close of the evidence or at 
such earlier time during the trial 
as the court reasonably directs, 
any party may file written requests 
that 'the court instruct the jury on the 
law as set forth in said requests. 
The Court shall inform counsel of 
its proposed action upon the requests 
prior to ins true ting the jury; and it 
shall furnish counsel with a copy of 
its proposed ins true tions, unless the 
parties stipulate that such instructions 
may be given orally, or otherwise 
waive this requirement. If the in-
structions are to be given in writing, 
all objections thereto must be made 
before the instructions are given to 
the jury; otherwise, objections may 
be made to the instructions after 
they are given to the jury, but before 
the jury retires to consider its ver-
dict. * No party may assign as error 
the giving or the failure to give an in-
struction unless he objects thereto. 
In objecting to the giving of an instruc-
tion, a party must state distinctly the 
matter to which he objects and the 
grounds for his objection. Notwith-
standing the foregoing requirement, 
the appellate court, in its discretion 
and in the interests of justice, may 
-10-
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review the giving or failure to give an 
instruction. Opportunity shall be given 
to make objections, and they shall be 
:t.nade, out of the hearing of the jury. 
"Arguments for the respective parties 
shall be made after the court has in-
structed the jury. The court shall 
not comment on the evidence in the 
case, and if the court states any of 
the evidence, it must instruct the 
jury that they are the exclusive 
judges of all questions of fact. 11 
*Underlining added. 
Under this rule plaintiff's attorney is en-
titled to take exceptions or object to the court's 
instructions "before they jury retires to consider 
its verdict." However, this is seldom, if ever, 
permitted under the Fourth District Court's 
"unwritten rule. 11 
In this case, plaintiff's attorney was not 
permitted to take exceptions to, or object to the 
trial court's instructions until after the jury had 
retired to deliberate upon a verdict. (Tr. 467, 
1. 17-22) 
Conduct of this type by the trial court was 
clearly arbitrary, unreasonable, prejudicial, and 
contrary to the above stated rule. 
-11-
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCT-
ING THE JURY 'iliA T NEGLIGENCE IN THIS CASE 
IS "THE FAILURE TO USE ORDINARY AND REA-
SONABLE CARE" AND THAT "ORDINARY CARE" 
WAS THE MEASURE OF CARE TO BE USED IN 
THIS CASE. 
The defendant's conduct and duty in this case 
is subject to the statutory restrictions imposed by 
sections 24-1-1 through 24-1-15, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, since the defendant's land was in a 
state designated fire control district. (Tr. 418, 1. 
1-19) 
W"here the statute, ordinance or permit lays 
.down a reasonable rule of conduct specifically de-
signed for safety of persons or property, violation 
proximately resulting in injury ccnstitutes negli-
gence per se. 
Where an act of God unites or co-mingles with 
negligence as an efficient and concurring proximate 
cause and injury or damage would not have occurred 
except for negligence, the person negligent should 
be held liable. 
The controlling case on this point is Bushnell, 
et al v. Telluride Power Co. 145 Federal 2d 950. In 
this Utah case the plaintiff recovered damages for 
defendant negligently starting a fire under conditions 
and facts very similar to those in this particular case. 
-12-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Telluride Fbwer case the court found that 
starting a fire without a permit alone constituted 
negligence, and where there is a controlling sta-
tute establishing a different standard of care,. the 
court should not give instructions on "reasonablet' 
or''ordinary care.'' 
Considering the extremely dry weather con-
ditions and the fact that the firebreaks in the area 
where defendant started his fires were full of dry 
1 eaves , ( T r. 9, 1 • 2 3- 3 0 ; T r. 1 0, 1 . 1 - 21 ) and 
considering the fact that the defendant was total-
ly disabled one hundred per cent (Tr. 372, 1. 
17-19; Tr. 428, 1. 15-26) and considering the 
fact that the defendant was only to burn fires up-
on his p:toperty subject to the restrictions set 
forth in the fire permit (see fire permit exhibit) 
and since the defendant did not comply with the 
providions of the fire permit, and was not equip-
ped either physically himself or with proper fire 
fighting equipment to fight a fire of any conse-
quence, (Tr. 428, 1. 15-30; Tr. 429, 1. 1-25) 
and considering the fact that the defendant was in 
the habit of leaving his fires unattended all day, 
and even overnight (Tr. 429, 1. 29-30; Tr. 430, 
1. 1- 6), the court erred in giving instructions 
Numbers 4, 5, 9, and 10, all dealing with. rea-
sonable or ordinary care. The defendant was 
guilty of negligence per se, on the basis of all 
the evidence, and the covrt should have so in-
structed the jury. 
-13-
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCT-
ING THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS 
NOT UNDER A DUTY TO ANTICIPATE AN UN-
USUAL WIND AT THE TIME OF STARTING THE 
FIRE AND IF AN UNUSUAL AND UNEXPECTED 
HIGH WIND AROSE DURING THE PROGRESS OF 
THE FIRE AND CARRIED TIE FIRE WHERE IT 
WOULD NOT HAVE OTHERWISE SPREAD, SUCH 
WIND CONSTITUTES AN INTERVENING CAUSE 
OF THE PLAINTIFF'S INJURY AND THE DEFEND-
ANT WOULD BE RELIEVED OF LIABILITY FOR 
DAMAGE CAUSED TIEREBY. 
There is no evidence in the record to indicate 
that there was any unusual or unexpected high winds 
at the time the defendant and his wife went for the 
fire department, and at that time the fire was clear-
ly out of control, because of the negligence of the 
defendant. (Tr. 443, 1. 11-23; Tr. 462, 1.1-24) 
The defendant and his wife both admit there was very 
little wind as does the defendant's witness Albert 
Peterson, who arrived at the scene of the fire at 
approximately 7:30 p. m. (Tr. 369, 1. 16-30; Tr. 
370, 1. 1-13) Under the law as established in the 
Telluride Power case, where an act of God unites 
or co-mingles with negligence as an efficient and 
concurring proximate cause and injury or damage 
would not have occurred except for negligence, 
the person negligent should be held liable, and the 
court sb.auld have so instructed the jury. 
-14-
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING 
THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES AS DRAWN TO 
THE JURY, BECAUSE THE INTERROGATORIES 
AS SUBMITTED COULD ONLY BE ANSWERED IN 
FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE OF THE 
COURT'S ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS. 
From what has already been pointed out, and 
the law applicable to points Nos. 3 and 4, it is clear 
the trial court erred in failing to properly instruct 
the jury, in failing to give plaintiff's requested in-
structions, particularly plaintiff's instruction No. 13. 
The trial court having erred in the instructions also 
erred when it gave special interrogatories based up-
on erroneous instructions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Leon M. Frazier, for 
FRAZIER AND JUDD 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant, Elmer Hanks 
-15-
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